Software becomes a product
From 9 December 2026 the EU Product Liability Directive covers software, AI included. A court can order evidence to be disclosed, and a product with no credible evidence can be presumed defective.
AI agents now approve payments, triage claims, write code and talk to customers. When one of them gets it wrong, the only witness is a log that the operator controls. Proof of Agent Work turns that log into evidence: signed, dated by an independent authority, and checkable by anyone. The record on the right is being verified live in your browser. Try to change it.
From 9 December 2026 the EU Product Liability Directive covers software, AI included. A court can order evidence to be disclosed, and a product with no credible evidence can be presumed defective.
High-risk AI systems must log events automatically and keep them for at least six months. The law does not say how anyone can tell whether a log was rewritten after the fact.
We believe the honest answer to "did the agent really do that?" is a record that the operator, the vendor and the insurer can all check, and that none of them can quietly change. That is what POAW is.
What a receipt is, what the EU AI Act and the Product Liability Directive ask for, where it earns its keep first, and how it becomes an open standard. One scene says what it does not do.
Voice: neural text-to-speech · music CC BY 4.0 (Kevin MacLeod) · legal references on the end card.
Voice: neural text-to-speech · the claim in the film is example data · Deutsche Fassung
Every run of an agent is written as a receipt. Each receipt answers three questions, and each answer can be checked with tools your own engineers already have.
Each step gets a fingerprint, and the fingerprints are chained into one root value. Change, remove or reorder a single step, and the root no longer matches.
The root is signed with a post-quantum signature (ML-DSA-65, the NIST FIPS 204 standard). The public key is published on the operator's own domain, so nobody has to trust a key that travels inside the record.
An independent time-stamping authority (RFC 3161, here DigiCert) stamps the signature. Nobody can backdate the record afterwards, us included.
What a valid receipt does not tell you: whether the agent decided well, or whether every action was logged. It proves what was recorded, by whom, and by when. The logging point is part of every pilot design, and we say so first.
"If an agent of ours causes a loss, can I prove to a court, a regulator or our insurer what actually happened?"
"Does this bind us to a vendor, and can my team verify it independently?"
poaw-receipt/2, COSE_Sign1 (/1 receipts still verify). SHA-256 Merkle root over the steps, ML-DSA-65 signature (FIPS 204), RFC 3161 timestamp token, key resolved via did:web."How do I price, reserve for, or recover on a loss caused by an AI agent?"
"We must log. Can we show the logs are genuine when it matters?"
A sovereign injection and content screen that runs on a commodity CPU before any GPU spend, so the prompt never leaves your premises. It runs on one plain CPU core in front of every model call. We publish no detection rate until a reproducible public rerun exists.
Disclosed gaps: role-play and story-style jailbreaks are the largest open gap; benign non-English text gets several times more false alarms than English (an opt-in dampener reduces them); paraphrased attacks are not caught by the pattern layer. Background and preprints at destill.ai/research.
Each AEGIS verdict can be written as a step into the POAW receipt. The record then shows not only what the agent did, but that the input was screened, with what result, before it acted. One receipt, both halves, verifiable without us.
Run on 22 October 2026 against the sample below. All three checks passed. With a single changed byte, each of them failed. A second, independent check with the cbor2 library is in test_independent.py.
# 1. fetch the receipt, the check script, and our public key (also published in did.json) curl -O https://destill.ai/poaw/sample-receipt.json curl -O https://destill.ai/poaw/verify_receipt.py curl -O https://destill.ai/poaw/destill-key-1.pem # 2. decode the COSE_Sign1, check the profile headers, recompute the RFC 9162 root (stdlib only); # writes sigstructure.bin (RFC 9052 Sig_structure with the root as detached payload), sig.bin, token.der python verify_receipt.py sample-receipt.json # 3. ML-DSA-65 signature (FIPS 204, RFC 9964), stock OpenSSL 3.5 or later openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey destill-key-1.pem -rawin -in sigstructure.bin -sigfile sig.bin # -> Signature Verified Successfully # 4. RFC 3161 timestamp over SHA-256 of the CBOR-encoded signature (RFC 9921 §3.1.1), against the TSA's chain openssl ts -verify -token_in -in token.der -digest <printed by step 2> -CAfile <your CA bundle> # -> Verification: OK
The PEM file holds the same key as did:web:destill.ai#key-1, re-encoded for OpenSSL. Check the bytes against did.json; you do not have to take our word for it. Receipts in the earlier poaw-receipt/1 layout are still accepted by both verifiers.
Paste a poaw-receipt/2 bundle (or an older /1 one) or drop the file here. Nothing is uploaded. The only network call fetches the signer's public key from the domain named in its DID. The full check page, with reasons in German and English and photo seals: destill.ai/pruefen.
poaw-receipt/2 = COSE Receipt (RFC 9942) + SCITT Signed Statement (RFC 9943)Since 22 October 2026 a POAW receipt is a tagged COSE_Sign1 that any RFC 9942 verifier can read. Nothing in the format is ours to license: the tree is RFC 9162, the signature RFC 9052/9964, the timestamp header RFC 9921. What this profile adds is the agent vocabulary and the did:web key rule. The earlier /1 layout is documented in the archived sample
| Element | Meaning |
|---|---|
| trace[] | The agent's steps (application/poaw-trace+json): seq (1…n, contiguous), type, payload, ts. Sensitive content is a SHA-256 hash. A step may be withheld and replaced by its leaf_hash; the root still verifies (selective disclosure). |
| receipt (base64 CBOR) | #6.18(COSE_Sign1): protected header, unprotected header, detached payload, signature. |
| protected: alg, typ, kid, cwt, vds | alg −49 = ML-DSA-65 (RFC 9964) · typ application/poaw-run-receipt+cose · kid the did:web key URL · cwt claims iss (the DID), sub (run id, urn:poaw:run:…), iat, poaw.key_custody, poaw.agent · vds 1 = RFC9162_SHA256. |
| payload (detached) | The RFC 9162 Merkle root over the trace: leaf = SHA-256(0x00 ‖ JCS(step)), node = SHA-256(0x01 ‖ left ‖ right), split at the largest power of two. The verifier recomputes it and supplies it when checking the signature. |
| signature | ML-DSA-65, pure, empty context, over the RFC 9052 Sig_structure ["Signature1", protected, "", root]. |
| unprotected 396 (vdp) | RFC 9942 inclusion proofs, one per disclosed step: [tree_size, leaf_index, path]. |
| unprotected 270 (3161-ctt) | An RFC 3161 TimeStampToken whose imprint is SHA-256 of the CBOR-encoded signature field, byte-string header included (RFC 9921 §3.1.1). It proves when the signature existed; step times are operator-asserted. |
| unprotected 394 (receipts) | Reserved for Transparency Service receipts (RFC 9943 layer B). Empty today: no public log yet. |
Profile text with every RFC section cited: POAW_SCITT_PROFILE.md (draft 0.1, on request). Core implementation shared by issuer and browser verifier: poaw-cose.js, tests incl. the RFC 9162 vectors from transparency-dev/merkle: poaw-cose.test.js.
/1 receipts still verify.did:web:destill.ai.poaw.key_custody claim.A pilot covers one workflow and takes two to four weeks. The decision then rests on whether your people could forge, backdate or edit a record, not on a slide.